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Abstract
Skills and skill formation have become central topics in contemporary political econo-
my. This essay traces a key concept in current debates – the distinction between general 
and specific skills – back to its diverse origins in American postwar labor economics, 
comparative industrial relations, and human capital theory. To show how the distinc-
tion has evolved over time and between disciplines, it is related to other dual classifica-
tions of work skills, like high versus low, broad versus narrow, theoretical versus expe-
riential, professional versus occupational, explicit versus tacit, extrafunctional versus 
functional, and certifiable versus noncertifiable. The aim is to reconstruct how notions 
of skill generality and skill specificity came to be used as a foundation of an econo-
mistic-functionalist “production regime,” “varieties of capitalism,” or “asset” theory of 
welfare state development, and generally of politics under capitalism.
Zusammenfassung
Berufliche Qualifikationen und berufliche Bildung sind ein zentrales Thema gegenwär-
tiger politisch-ökonomischer Forschung. Der Aufsatz untersucht einen Schlüsselbegriff 
der Diskussion – die Unterscheidung zwischen allgemeinen und spezialisierten Fähig-
keiten – mit Hinblick auf seine diversen Ursprünge in der amerikanischen Arbeitsöko-
nomie der Nachkriegsjahre, der vergleichenden Forschung über industrielle Arbeits-
beziehungen und der Humankapitaltheorie. Um zu zeigen, wie die Begriffsbildung 
sich mit der Zeit und zwischen den verschiedenen Disziplinen entwickelt hat, wird sie 
mit anderen dualen Klassifikationen von beruflichen Fertigkeiten – hoch und niedrig, 
breit und eng, theoretisch und erfahrungsbasiert, explizit und implizit, extrafunktional 
und funktional, zertifizierbar und nicht zertifizierbar – in Beziehung gesetzt. Ziel ist 
herauszuarbeiten, wie die Unterscheidung zwischen allgemeinen und speziellen Qua-
lifikationen zur Grundlage diverser ökonomistisch-funktionalistischer Theorien der 
wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Entwicklung und allgemein der Politik im Kapitalismus werden 
konnte.
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Skills and Politics: General and Specific
Introduction
Skills and skill formation have become central topics in contemporary political econ-
omy. In this essay I will trace key concepts used in the current debate – above all, the 
distinction between general and specific skills – back to their origins in American post-
war labor economics, comparative industrial relations, and human capital theory. To 
show how they have evolved over time and between disciplines, I will relate them to 
other dual classifications of work skills, like theoretical versus experiential, high versus 
low, broad versus narrow, explicit versus tacit, extrafunctional versus functional, and 
certifiable versus noncertifiable. My aim is to reconstruct how they came to be used – al-
though they should not have – as the foundation of a functionalist-cum-rational choice, 
or in other words: an economistic, “production regime” (Soskice 1999), “varieties of 
capitalism” (Hall/Soskice 2001b), or “asset” (Iversen/Soskice 2001) theory of welfare 
state development, and generally of politics under capitalism.1
In particular, the point I want to make is that “liberal” countries with no or only a re-
sidual welfare state are not in the condition in which they are because workers in these 
countries typically have “general” skills, allegedly needed and employed by the distinc-
tive mode of production in their respective national economies, and because workers 
with such skills can, for sound economic reasons, be happy to do without social pro-
tection. In other words, I will argue that so-called “asset theories” of politics (Iversen/
Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2006, 2007) in so-called “market economies” (Hall/Soskice 
2001a) have no basis, neither in the political history of modern capitalism (Korpi 2006) 
nor in the reality of national patterns of skills and skill formation and their interaction 
with, among other things, labor markets, work organization, trade union structure, em-
ployer organization, and the strategic choices of firms. My contention will be that such 
theories suffer from an underlying, characteristic misunderstanding of what skills are 
and how they are acquired, a misunderstanding that is rooted in an uncritical reception 
of human capital theory, as well as in a rationalist misconception of the relationship 
between politics and the economy, or between social structures and economic pressures 
for efficiency. 
1 I use the three expressions synonymously as the theories they refer to conceive of the relation-
ship between skills and political-economic institutions in the same way. 
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Skilled versus unskilled
Skills and skill formation were from the beginning at the center of Anglo-American 
labor economics. Originally labor economics was a branch of institutional economics 
and shaded into the study of industrial relations, with its focus on collective bargain-
ing and its connection to work organization and the flexibility of labor markets and 
production arrangements (Kerr 1954; Kerr et al. 1960; Dunlop 1993 [1958]). The ba-
sic distinction here, as suggested by the structure of Anglo-American labor markets, 
was between skilled and unskilled labor. In the ideal-typical Anglo-American pattern, 
skilled workers were organized in so-called “craft unions,” whereas unskilled workers 
were at first unorganized and later, in a “second wave of unionization,” were represented 
by separate “general” or “industrial” unions.2 Craft unions had emerged in the early 
industrializing economies of Britain and the United States more or less as modern suc-
cessors to the medieval guilds; in many ways they functioned like associations of small 
business. For example, initially they were averse to collective bargaining, preferring in-
stead unilaterally to post what they called “prices” for the different “jobs” their “trade” 
was skilled to perform, in what was perceived by their political and legal opponents as 
a “conspiracy against free trade.”
With increasing size of factories and the consolidation of industrial firms, the members 
of craft unions gradually turned from subcontractors into wage workers. But in many 
ways their unions continued to behave like business cartels, and where they became 
powerful they were able to dictate to employers on a wide range of subjects. Controlling 
and in a sense owning the skill in which their members specialized, craft unions as-
pired to establish something like property rights over the work arrangements in which 
it was exercised. Not only could workers acquire craft skills exclusively through an ap-
prenticeship served with the union, which enabled the latter to limit access to its trade 
and thereby keep the supply of skilled labor low and skilled wages high. Craft unions 
also ran job exchanges and with time learned to make employers abide by a division 
of labor at the workplace – a standardized “job demarcation” – that was tailored to fit 
the union’s and its members’ skills. To the extent that they succeeded in imposing the 
same organization of work on all employers in their domain, this ensured that union 
members could exercise their skills in a large number of workplaces, making such skills 
transportable across employers and giving workers the option to quit where working 
conditions were not to their liking.
The crowning achievement of craft unionism was the “closed shop,” under which em-
ployers who needed a skill controlled by a craft union had to agree to employ only union 
members (workers who had served their apprenticeship with the union and possessed 
a “union card”). Employers were also supposed not to “dilute the skill” by employing 
2 For a similar account see Culpepper and Thelen (2008). For a short summary of the history 
of trade unionism in different countries and the various forms trade unions took, see Streeck 
(2005, 266–269). A classical labor history text is Kendall (1975).
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someone without a union card or by changing the organization of work, typically by in-
troducing new technology, so that the job could be performed by an “unskilled” worker. 
Being as strong as they were at the workplace, especially in Britain but also in parts of 
the United States, craft unions tended to be politically conservative (Marks 1989); all 
they wanted from government was the right to look after themselves through free col-
lective bargaining. Thus, British craft unions for a long time sided with the Liberals and 
would not see the need for a political party representing labor in particular. Since their 
members typically prospered, craft unions also had little interest in public provision of 
welfare; here as well they preferred to rely on their own strength, running mutual sup-
port funds and serving as “benevolent societies” for members who were in difficulties. 
When, at the end of the nineteenth century, the growing masses of “unskilled” or “gen-
eral” workers struggled to get organized as well, craft unions were skeptical if not hos-
tile as the new “second-wave” unions aspired to represent workers across industries 
and skills, pushed for wage leveling, engaged in political action and clamored for state 
intervention, and sided with socialist movements and parties. But since craft unions 
were already well established, general unions hardly ever succeeded in their efforts to 
integrate skilled workers into broad-based industrial unions. Instead they had to face, 
like the American CIO in relation to the AFL, a powerful defense of wage differentials, 
or “relativities,” and of “job territories,” as well as an ingrained preference of the estab-
lished trade union movement for private and particularistic as opposed to public and 
universal welfare provision. Divisions between the two types of union remained strong 
and politically consequential even as the new general unions adapted their modus ope-
randi to that of their older brothers, relying on seniority rights and promotion ladders 
as functional equivalents of skill and apprenticeship, on the union shop as a substitute 
for the closed shop, and on internal rather than external labor markets.
Thus at the height of the industrial age, Anglo-American labor economics had come 
to distinguish between two types of skills, craft and general. Craft skills were high but 
narrow and specific; while they were portable between workplaces, this was essentially 
as a result of collective action of workers wresting control from employers over work 
organization and hiring. On the other side there were general skills, if they were skills 
at all, which were broad in the sense of unspecific and widely usable in any industry, 
provided it required manual and physical labor. Here, instead of promoting mobility 
of labor between workplaces by making employers standardize their organization of 
work, unions demanded employment and seniority rights in internal labor markets, 
in order to protect their members from continuously having to move their low and 
unspecific skills between employers at the latter’s discretion. For both craft and general 
skills, it was thus through an elaborate system of institutions that labor markets were 
demarcated, boundaries and entry points were defined, access to both qualifications 
and employment was regulated, and the breadth of skills as well as labor markets was 
determined (Kerr 1954). We will return to these relationships later.
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In the 1960s and 1970s at the latest, the Anglo-American pattern of skills and their 
distribution and production, with its reflection in divided trade unionism, horizontally 
and vertically segmented labor markets, and a rigid system of job demarcation and 
entitlement at the workplace, came increasingly to be seen as a source of competitive 
disadvantage in a changing world economy (Flanagan et al. 1983). Accelerating tech-
nological change caused a proliferation of conflicts over job territories and wage dif-
ferentials. Whereas skilled workers often refused to operate new machines unless they 
were paid extraordinary bonuses, especially in Britain, unskilled workers lacked the req-
uisite industrial power and took recourse to militant wage bargaining. The result was 
a growing desire on the part of management, certainly in the United States, to replace 
labor with automated machinery and move from the Taylorism of the first half of the 
twentieth century to fully automated factories. In both Britain and the United States, 
industrial productivity lagged behind, with product and process innovation suffering 
from a rigid shop floor. Thus mass production lingered on, although what would have 
been required for competitiveness in increasingly saturated international markets was 
product differentiation and flexible small-batch production (Sorge/Streeck 1988). For 
this, however, general workers were not skilled enough, while skilled workers were too 
few and their skills were too narrow and specific.3 The situation was made worse by 
the fact that craft unions had allowed their traditional training systems to deteriorate, 
among other things by excluding women and ethnic minorities from apprenticeships, 
prolonging the latter to periods of up to seven years, emptying the content of training 
to “time served” as a “craftsman’s helper,” and generally redefining skill from a capacity 
to do demanding work to an entitlement to be hired whenever a particular specialized 
activity was to be performed and, once hired, to refuse to perform any other activity.
Broad versus narrow
In the 1970s and 1980s, Anglo-American research in industrial relations and, as it came 
to be called, human resource management began to take an interest in a comparative 
perspective, looking in particular at countries like Germany and Japan, which were then 
the rising industrial powers. I will focus here on Germany because of its collective and 
multi-employer system of skill formation, which is different from the kind of firm-
based skill formation that prevails in Japan, even though the Japanese system is in many 
ways functionally equivalent to the German one (Streeck/Yamamura 2001; Yamamura/
Streeck 2003). As German industry was apparently much better than its Anglo-Amer-
ican competition at absorbing technological change and work reorganization and at 
industrial restructuring in general, it did not take long for the German skilled worker, 
the Facharbeiter, to attract attention (Dertouzos et al. 1989). Here there was a manual 
worker with high but also broad skills, trained in widely accessible and publicly super-
3  On craft unions and their “restrictive practices,” especially in Britain, see Flanders (1970).
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vised apprenticeships, and in such ample supply that industrial workforces were some-
times almost entirely composed of skilled workers. Moreover, these were easy to retrain 
and redeploy in internal labor markets, while at the same time they were highly mobile 
in the external labor market due to their certified portable skills. Germany, it was noted, 
not only had many more skilled workers than Anglo-America, but they were also less 
specialized.
Soon this observation came to be related to a set of institutional characteristics of Ger-
man industrial relations that had become associated in the 1970s with the notion of 
liberal (or neo-)corporatism (Schmitter 1974; Lehmbruch 1977): encompassing “in-
dustrial” trade unions organizing skilled and unskilled workers alike; strong employer 
associations and collective bargaining at the industrial level, which compressed the 
wage spread between, among others, the skilled and unskilled; as well as an absence of 
claims to job ownership making for low shop-floor conflict, high flexibility of task as-
signment, and fast absorption of new technology at the point of production. All of this 
appeared to be linked to a structure of interest representation that effectively separated 
workplace and industry-level regulation of working conditions, basically by keeping 
works councils apart from trade unions and differentiating the tasks of the former from 
those of the latter, thereby insulating the workplace from distributive conflict especially 
over wages (Streeck 1984).
From here, it was only a small step to the realization that the German system of voca-
tional training was as important an arena of joint regulation at the industry level as 
was collective bargaining, even though it was less easy to recognize as such and dif-
ficult to understand from the outside (Streeck et al. 1987; Streeck/Hilbert 1991). Like 
wage setting, unions and employer associations jointly administered a complex “web of 
rules” (Dunlop 1993 [1958]) licensed by the state and under its watchful eye. Together, 
in tripartite cooperation, they ran and kept current a national system of occupations 
and occupational training profiles that, through publicly supervised examination and 
certification of acquired skills, allowed for, in principle, unlimited mobility of work-
ers in nationwide sectoral labor markets. Moreover, unlike the Anglo-American world, 
employers were obviously prepared to invest large sums of money in the skills of their 
workforces, and in broad and therefore widely transportable skills to boot, while trade 
unions not only tolerated general upskilling but pressed incessantly for broader and 
better training of, ideally, all workers in their domain. As a result, German firms could 
benefit from an almost unlimited supply of high skills as well as from unmatched flex-
ibility in the deployment of labor on the shop floor. Among other things, this allowed 
them to use the opportunities of the new microelectronic technology for abandoning 
mass production in favor of more complex and more customized and diversified high-
quality products, rather than for eliminating labor (Piore/Sabel 1984; Sorge/Streeck 
1988; Streeck 1991).
It was in this context that German vocational training became an inspiring research site 
for numerous students of subjects like comparative industrial relations, corporatism 
6 MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/1
and institutional change. As to industrial relations, differences and similarities between 
the Anglo-American and the Germanic world posed a long series of intriguing and, as 
it turned out, theoretically highly fruitful questions: for example, on the differences be-
tween German Handwerk and English “craft,” or between craft and occupational skills; 
on the differences and commonalities between Betriebsräte and Vertrauensleute on the 
one hand and shop stewards on the other, and the like. In the United States and Britain 
in particular, researchers in industrial relations, at least those who cared, noticed with 
astonishment that skills were not necessarily scarce and elitist; that high skills could be 
abundant, broad in content and widely distributed, and much less rationed and nar-
rowly specific than under a craft regime; that skills could enhance flexibility not just 
in external but also in internal labor markets; that high wage differentials were not the 
only way to get workers to undergo training; and that unions could do without “restric-
tive practices,” job ownership and seniority rights, and still effectively represent their 
members (Finegold 1993; Crouch et al. 1999).
Concerning the study of corporatism, the German training system came to serve as 
a key exhibit for those who believed in the benefits of “private interest government” 
supplementing public government (Streeck/Schmitter 1985), as well as in the beneficial 
effects of unions being safely institutionalized as representatives of their members, both 
for the latter and for society as a whole. To some, a strategy of cooperative skill en-
hancement, as in the “German model,” appeared as a promising way of defending trade 
union power and political status against the rising tide of neo-liberalism (Streeck 1992; 
Rogers/Streeck 1994). German vocational training also became a key research site for 
the emerging historical-institutionalist approach in political economy, which took up 
the challenge to explain how the obviously very different but also recognizably related 
German and Anglo-American patterns of skill formation had arisen out of a common 
pre-industrial past yet followed different national paths of institutional development, 
shaped by factors like the timing of industrialization, the vagaries of politics and power, 
and the lasting historical effects of different kinds of government intervention. A still 
unmatched milestone achievement in this field is, of course, Kathleen Thelen’s seminal 
book How Institutions Evolve (2004). 
As to policy, German vocational training soon took on the status of a model for those 
who believed that, to overcome what was seen as an Anglo-American “low skill equi-
librium” (Finegold/Soskice 1988), employers in the United States and Britain had to 
be made to invest more in skill formation at the workplace than the few hours or days 
they typically devoted to “breaking in” new recruits. The German example was also held 
up by the European Union in its effort to promote a common European approach to a 
globally competitive high-skill economy. For this purpose a special agency, CEDEFOP, 
was created and initially located in Berlin. It soon turned out, however, that the trans-
plantation across national borders of an institution reaching as deep into the fabric 
of the political economy as a collective skill formation system was a utopian project, 
its efficient operation being far too dependent on complementary institutions of, for 
example, labor market regulation and workplace interest representation, and generally 
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on a sympathetic political, institutional and cultural context. In fact, in the 1990s at the 
latest, the United States and Britain finally gave up on industrial upskilling and, with it, 
on the industrial working class. Instead they adopted a strategy of accelerated transition 
to a “service economy” that relied on skills of a much different sort: those needed by a 
thoroughly deregulated financial sector.4
General versus specific
To recapitulate, in the tradition of Anglo-American institutional labor economics, spe-
cific skills were craft skills: high but rare and narrow; mobile but only within a sharply 
demarcated job territory and conditional on trade union job control; and at permanent 
risk of becoming technologically obsolete. General skills − the skills of “general work-
ers” − were low, abundant, and broad as workers having (only) such skills were usable 
in a wide range of − “unskilled” − employment. Workers with general skills, while argu-
ably in dire need of social protection by law or collective agreement, had a hard time 
getting such protection, owing to the dominance in industrial relations of the older 
craft unions with their established strong preference for free and open labor markets. In 
Germany, by comparison, high skills, while also specific, were not just more widespread 
but typically broader and more widely employable than Anglo-American craft skills, 
which reduced the need on the part of workers for job control and a standardized, and 
thus rigid, organization of work. General skills, in the sense of low skills, on the other 
hand, were infrequent as the vocational training system absorbed the vast majority of 
the traditionally large number of young people in Germany who did not enter tertiary 
education. As a consequence, German labor markets were less segmented, both hori-
zontally between skills and vertically between the skilled and the unskilled, while work 
organization on the shop floor was more flexible.
Still, differences aside, in both Anglo-American and German usage the distinction be-
tween general and specific skills referred to the nature and variety of tasks a worker had 
4 In the United States in the early 1990s, a broad public consensus existed that, for the country to 
regain industrial leadership and defend its international competitiveness, it had to embark on a 
large-scale national strategy of upgrading work skills (for many others see Dertouzos et al. 1989; 
Hamilton 1990; Thurow 1992; Solmon/Levenson 1994). When the first Clinton administration 
came into office in January 1993, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich began to make plans for a 
comprehensive reform of worker training. Not least, training reform was seen as part of a gen-
eral effort to combat the growing inequality among American citizens, an effort which included 
the potential introduction of legally based workforce representation (Freeman 1994). All this 
came to an abrupt end with the catastrophic defeat of the Democrats in the mid-term elections 
of 1994. In subsequent years, with social reform politically blocked, Clinton and his advisers 
placed their hope for economic prosperity on financial deregulation, which was a policy the Re-
publicans were happy to support (Stiglitz 2003). Today, after the strategy of substituting credit 
for training has resulted in the Great Recession of 2008ff., this is considered by some as a histori-
cal mistake, and calls for educational and social reform are again heard (Rajan 2010).
8 MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/1
the capacity to perform, even though in Anglo-America such capacity included some-
thing like an institutionalized job entitlement whereas in Germany it consisted, and 
continues to consist, simply of an internalized and certified personal ability. It is im-
portant to note but seems far from generally understood that this way of distinguishing 
between specific and general skills must not be confounded with one that distinguishes 
between skills on the basis of whether they can be used in just one workplace or in more 
than one, the purpose of the distinction being to establish an efficient allocation of the 
costs of training. I refer to this as to the neoclassical or human capital approach to skills 
and skill formation, as opposed to the traditional institutional economics approach. Its 
most influential representative is, of course, the economist Gary Becker (see in particu-
lar Becker 1993).
Becker’s discovery, as it were, was that important insights can be gained if skills are 
treated as capital and skill formation as capital formation. From this perspective Becker 
explores the consequences of the fact that skills, or “human capital,” reside in the worker 
and not in the firm, and may move in a free labor market with the worker to competing 
firms. Using theoretical modeling, Becker investigates the effects of potential worker 
mobility on the incentives for employers to train and for workers to learn; on wage 
levels and wage structures; and on the stability of employment (Becker 1993, ch. 3). As 
it turns out, the crucial factor is whether acquisition of a given work skill, in the sense 
of a worker’s personal ability to perform a particular task, may make the worker more 
productive, and thereby increase his earnings capacity and contribution to profitability, 
“in many firms besides those providing it” – “it” being the skill – through on-the-job 
training (Becker 1993: 33). Among the various implications that this is shown to have, 
the central one for present purposes is that, where this is the case, a worker’s employer 
has no incentive to pay for the training, so that training for such skills must be paid by 
the worker or some other agent on his behalf.
The thrust of Becker’s argument is that the training of workers should be organized in 
ways that are what economists call incentive-compatible, with those who benefit from it 
bearing the costs. The pivotal question is whether skills are portable across workplaces 
or not. If an employer paid for the formation of a kind of human capital that a worker 
could profitably deploy elsewhere, her competitors could abstain from training and 
“poach” her skilled workers, by offering them higher wages out of what they have saved 
on training. Skills that are in this way transportable, and therefore “poachable” and, as 
a consequence, unlikely to be paid for by “rational” employers Becker calls “general” 
skills. For employers, to pay for training pays only if the skills that the training generates 
cannot be productively used outside their firm, making it impossible for opportunistic 
workers to sell them elsewhere, and for opportunistic employers to buy them on the 
cheap. Skills that cannot be carried from one firm to another Becker calls “specific.”5 
5 “Completely general training increases the marginal productivity of trainees by exactly the same 
amount in the firms providing the training as in other firms … Completely specific training can 
be defined as training that has no effect on the productivity of trainees that would be useful in 
other firms” (Becker 1993: 40).
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It may be helpful in passing to note what human capital theory does not claim. For ex-
ample, Becker never rules out the possibility – which figures centrally in the theory and 
practice of workplace-based training and in particular of apprenticeship systems – that 
certain, highly valuable skills may best be acquired at the workplace even though they 
are general in nature, in the sense of usable outside the firm when they were acquired. 
It is true that Becker’s exposition often seems to be beholden to the American model 
of a strict separation between general education in schools and firm-specific on-the-
job training in firms. Nevertheless, it does allow for general training on the job (see 
especially 1993: 30ff.), provided it is paid for by the worker, mostly in the form of lower 
wages. There is no necessary identification of workplace-based with firm-specific train-
ing, nor does anything in the theory preclude a role for the public in cases of market 
failure, for example when children have to learn the famous “3 Rs” – Reading, wRiting, 
aRithmetic – or when families are too poor or unwilling to invest in the education of 
their offspring. Nor does the theory rule out cooperation and coordination in general 
training between firms and schools. In fact, there is even a brief reference to groups of 
firms running joint apprenticeship systems (Becker 1993: 49).6
Most importantly in the present context, Becker’s distinction between general and spe-
cific skills has, as noted above, nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of such skills: 
whether they are academic or not, theoretical or experiential, explicit or tacit, or func-
tional or extrafunctional.7 As indicated, nowhere is it ruled out that tacit or experiential 
knowledge acquired in a given workplace may be valuable in other workplaces as well, 
and the same holds for extrafunctional skills such as “good work habits” and the ability 
to show up on time, cooperate with others, work under stress and the like – which are 
important work skills that are best learned at work. That is to say, Becker’s perspective 
is not a technical but a strictly economic and indeed “firm-centered”8 one: skills are 
general if they are portable between employers, and specific to the extent that demand 
for them is monopsonistic.
The importance of getting this definition right may be illustrated by the example of the 
Japanese production system. Becker’s theory of human capital need not claim that the 
– famously high – skills of Japanese automobile workers, although entirely the result of 
in-firm training and workplace experience, are not in principle portable from one in-
6 Still, the fact that cooperation between firms may be publicly mandated in collective training 
systems may be hard to account for in neoclassical economics with its voluntaristic, free-market, 
rational-choice bias. The same applies to the fact that the content of workplace training in 
collective training systems is often regulated, with the purpose of limiting the discretion of 
individual employers as to the kind of skills they provide and the extent of productive work 
apprentices are allowed to perform, in order to ensure that the resulting skills are as broad and 
widely portable as possible.
7 “Tacit knowledge” is the central concept in Michael Polanyi’s magisterial book Personal Knowl-
edge (1958). The notion of “extrafunctional qualifications” was introduced by Ralf Dahrendorf 
(1956 ).
8 To use a central concept in economistic theories of “varieties of capitalism” (Hall/Soskice 
2001a). 
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ternal labor market to another, say from Honda to Toyota. Put another way, there is no 
reason why human capital theory would have to assume that the enormous investment 
of Japanese auto manufacturers in training is spent exclusively on skills, in particular 
extrafunctional and tacit skills, that would not also be productive in other automobile 
factories. Still, for human capital theory they remain “specific” as long as Japanese auto 
manufacturers continue to honor a tacit mutual agreement never to hire workers from 
a competitor except at the bottom entry point of their internal labor markets. Together 
with a steep age–earnings profile, this ensures that workers are caught in the inter-
nal labor market of their current employer. Whatever skills the latter imparts on them 
through training and a learning-intensive organization of work are in this way made 
specific in an economic sense, that is, de facto usable in one and only one workplace, 
not because of their substantive content, but as a result of the particular institutional 
structure that governs, or in any case used to govern, Japanese industrial labor markets.9
School versus workplace
Becker’s theory of human capital formation serves well as a background for under-
standing the nature of a German-type training system, its modus operandi as well as 
its more recent problems, and for a stylized account of the differences between Anglo-
American and German-style labor markets, in particular with respect to the definition 
and significance of “general” and “specific” skills. 
In both Anglo-America and Germany, workplaces were traditionally widely used as 
places of training, in particular but by no means exclusively for tacit, experiential, and 
extrafunctional skills. Moreover, both systems were governed by regulatory institutions 
that saw to it that workplace-based training did not become entirely firm-specific and 
that skills acquired at one workplace were at least in part also general so that they could 
be used in other workplaces as well. Regulatory institutions, however, differed funda-
mentally, and this made for equally fundamental differences in the structure of the skills 
generated. In Anglo-American settings, labor mobility was safeguarded through craft 
unions imposing a standardized organization of work on the firms in their domain. 
Since it was the unions who unilaterally determined, based on their industrial power, 
the content of their members’ skills and in addition ran the respective apprenticeship 
systems, they not only had an incentive but also the means to define skill profiles nar-
rowly and defend them against change. 
This was different in German-type systems where skill formation was governed on a 
tripartite basis. Here, mobility was provided for by public examination and certifica-
tion of acquired skills. Especially from the 1960s onward, there was also a continuous 
9 Which are, using Kerr’s term, like most labor markets “institutional” or “balkanized” (Kerr 
1954).
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broadening of occupational skill profiles, which was achieved by merging neighboring 
occupations and sharply reducing their overall number. Furthermore, all three parties 
involved kept pressing for training standards to be upgraded, including a strengthen-
ing of the “theoretical” content of training as provided above all by vocational schools 
(“dual system”). While employers were seeking high skills, a flexible organization of 
work made possible by polyvalent workers, as well as worker and union support for 
industrial change, unions strived to maximize their members’ employment and earning 
opportunities by enhancing the portability of their personal work skills in the absence 
of formal job entitlements. The government, for its part, was interested above all in flex-
ible labor markets that would ensure high employment and economic growth, and it 
considered workplace-based training an essential complement of public education and 
active labor market policy. 
As indicated, in the 1970s at the latest it became evident that Anglo-American work 
skills had become technologically outdated, excessively narrow, and scarce; they also 
compared unfavorably with German-style occupational skills, which were not only 
abundant but also had been continuously upgraded. Anglo-American deficiencies were 
widely considered a historical legacy of both craft unions and their restrictive practices, 
as well as of the response of employers to them. Faced with union indifference or resis-
tance to the expansion and modernization of industrial training, employers had early 
on embarked on a strategy of de-skilling which given the circumstances, could not but 
be identical with de-unionization, especially with the breaking of craft union control 
over work organization (Braverman 1974). Where unions were weakened or eliminated, 
apprenticeship disappeared and on-the-job training was reduced to firm-specific train-
ing, while the acquisition of more generally usable, portable skills was relocated in a 
vast and rapidly growing industry of vocational schools and community colleges. One 
of their attractions was that the skills they presumably imparted on their students ap-
peared more “academic,” which made them more socially prestigious. Moreover, train-
ing for such skills was mostly paid for by the trainees, many of whom took out loans on 
their house, thereby relieving employers of training costs. 
By the end of the twentieth century, however, it had become apparent that what people 
learned and paid for in the classrooms of the new training industry was often no less 
narrow and job- or firm-specific than traditional skills. Coordination between training 
in schools and on the job was scant, except where school curricula were “customized” to 
the specific needs of a major local employer, which they often were. At the same time, in 
manufacturing firms as in the growing service sector, a de-skilled work organization, af-
ter decades of Bravermanian separation of execution from conception, drew on general 
skills mostly in the sense of no particular skills and relied below the managerial level on 
what is called in German Jedermannsqualifikationen (everyman’s skills, Sengenberger 
1978).
Again, what made the difference was the institutional regime and, in particular, the role 
of employers in it. (As noted, no such regime is envisioned in the neoclassical, free-
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market, voluntaristic framework of Beckerian human capital theory.) Whereas in An-
glo-America individual firms had traditionally faced narrowly specialized craft unions, 
with little or no government involvement, in Germany their interlocutors were broad-
based industrial unions, various public agencies and, importantly, strong employer as-
sociations (Streeck et al. 1987). Their role was essentially that of organizer of a mutual 
assurance game. While agreeing to and indeed promoting an expansion of industrial 
training, more academically demanding curricula, more frequent release of trainees for 
schooling and the like, all of which increased the costs of training, they guaranteed co-
operating firms that they would make a majority of their competitors cooperate as well. 
Thus, a firm investing more in broader training could be sure that it would not be left 
alone to be later exploited by its competition. In the end, all firms would be able to share 
in the benefits of cooperation, consisting of a large pool of skilled workers accessible to 
and sufficient for the entire industry, with a rich supply of workplace-created but never-
theless portable skills in particular, with labor markets remaining open and flexible. 
German institutions and the way they were used to regulate skill formation at the work-
place, including the relationship between theoretical and experiential training and their 
allocation between schools and workplaces, did not just solve problems but also in-
creasingly created them. With time, continued upskilling, as jointly promoted by em-
ployer associations, trade unions, and the government, excluded growing segments of 
successive age cohorts from the apprenticeship system, also because elementary and 
secondary schools increasingly failed to prepare students for the ever more demanding 
training curricula. At the same time, economic and social change led to rising numbers 
of young people attending universities rather than seeking apprenticeships, in search 
perhaps of economic opportunities, social status, or leisure.10 Moreover, firms have 
become less easy to control for their associations, eroding the latter’s capacity to reas-
sure their members that they will be able to make a majority of firms participate in 
industrial training. In part this seems to be because of increased competitive pressures, 
higher turnover among small and medium-sized firms, and growing specialization, 
which makes it more difficult and costly for firms to train apprentices according to ever 
more demanding training plans. As the associations’ ability to provide mutual assur-
ance declines, more and more firms are exiting from the cooperative training system, 
confronting policymakers with questions like how to prevent the institutional separa-
tion of theoretical instruction at school and practical experience at the workplace; to 
preserve the advantages for skill formation of using the workplace as a training site; to 
keep high-skill labor markets flexible; and to protect workers from being captured in 
internal labor markets.
10 According to a recent time-budget study, German university students at the bachelor or master 
level work only 26 hours per week on average, which is much less than apprentices. The study, 
as reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 11 October 2010, confirms the suspicion 
that university attendance amounts in many cases to a period of carefree extended adolescence, 
subsidized by very low or non-existent tuition fees and often cash stipends provided by the 
government. Young people in vocational training have none of this. 
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General skills, liberal markets? 
Recently revisionist theories of democratic politics and the welfare state have drawn on 
a political economy of skills and skill formation to picture contemporary capitalism as a 
regime of institutionalized “coordination” between capital and labor for joint economic 
benefit. In an efficiency-theoretical framework, market-containing institutions like so-
cial insurance or employment protection are explained not as outcomes of class conflict 
and class politics, but as consensually created devices to facilitate cooperation between 
employers and workers and thereby increase productivity and competitiveness. Rather 
than imposed by political power or public authority, capitalist political-economic in-
stitutions are conceived as rationally chosen and voluntarily contracted by agents with 
a shared interest in a maximally efficient economy. Where institutions are set up or 
maintained by the state, the latter figures not as a seat of coercive power, but as a joint 
management board of associated efficiency-seeking producers. In particular, two pre-
sumably equally viable and competitive configurations of capitalist institutions – two 
“varieties of capitalism” (Hall/Soskice 2001a), or capitalist “welfare production regimes” 
(Estévez-Abe et al. 2001) – are presented as alternative versions of a consensual “market 
economy”: one referred to as “liberal” (the so-called “LME”), the other as “coordinated” 
(the so-called “CME”).
Rational choice accounts of institutions and social structures require a “microfounda-
tion” in the form of a theory of the, supposedly, rational interests driving the individual 
behavior that makes for the imputed efficiency of the social order. In the founding 
documents of the efficiency-theoretical branch of the “varieties of capitalism” litera-
ture, also known as “VoC,”11 this role is filled by transaction cost economics, in the 
version of Oliver Williamson.12 Transaction cost theory, as in The Economic Institutions 
of Capitalism (Williamson 1985), takes the exchange transaction between the owners 
of complementary resources, or “assets,” as its basic unit of analysis. Transactions are 
broadly classified as of two kinds, depending on the nature of the assets involved. In 
particular, assets may be “general,” or unspecific, if they are valuable to a large number 
of potential users. Or they may be “specialized,” to the extent that they are of value to 
only one user or a small number of them. Transactions involving general assets are be-
lieved not to pose particular problems, as they can be handled by simple spot-market, 
“clean-in, clean-out” contracting. Exchange of specialized, or nonredeployable, assets, 
however, may create bilateral dependencies and thereby expose agents to each other’s 
“opportunism.” It is thus unlikely to come about, and investment in transaction-specific 
assets, highly profitable as it may be, is unlikely to be made, unless suitable institu-
tions are set up to protect the parties against the various kinds of “contractual hazards.” 
Then, relational contracts take the place of spot-market contracts, and institutions of 
economic “governance” are devised by the traders themselves, or by government on 
11 For a critical review of the “VoC” approach, see Streeck (2011).
12 Called by VoC theorists “the new microeconomics,” or “the new economics of organization” 
(Hall/Soskice 2001a: 6, 14). See also Emmenegger (2009: 411).
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their behalf,13 to insure asset-specific transactions against the risk of breakdown due to 
hold-up or the fear of it.
What are the “assets” that, according to “asset theory” (Iversen/Soskice 2001), make ac-
tors under capitalism resort to markets pure and simple if they are unspecific, and rely 
on complex institutions if they are specialized? The most important transaction in capi-
talism being that between capital and labor, it is here that VoC, in its effort to dislodge 
power resource theories of political economy and the welfare state, brings in skills while 
short-circuiting Beckerian human capital theory and Williamsonian transaction cost 
economics.14 The core claim is that “LMEs” are what they are – that is, reliant mostly 
on markets for economic “coordination” and “requiring” only a small welfare state if 
at all – because in them the relationship between capital and labor is predominantly 
about the deployment of general, in the sense of transaction-unspecific, skills. As work-
ers in “LMEs” can always sell their skills to other employers who could also use them, 
they have no need for insurance against risks of dismissal or unemployment. Similarly, 
employers who primarily use general skills do not have to worry about reassuring work-
ers that they can invest in skill formation without having to fear being blackmailed 
afterwards. In “CMEs,” on the other hand, the skills that workers command and em-
ployers require are supposed to be “specific,” or “co-specific” in relation to the, equally 
specialized, means and processes of production operated by employers.15 “Because the 
transferability of skills is inversely related to their specificity” (Iversen/Soskice 2001: 
875), this exposes both workers and employers to the risk of exchange between them 
breaking down or not coming to pass in the first place.16 This is to explain why, alleg-
13 This would be “public ordering,” as distinguished from “private ordering.” The latter is consid-
ered to take place “in the shadow” of the former. Generally, however, transaction cost theory 
gives precedence to private ordering, which it regards as more flexible and adaptable to different 
situations and problems. Public ordering is ideally confined to authoritative adjudication by the 
courts.
14 The following is a synthetic paraphrase of several sources, in particular Iversen and Soskice 
(2001), Hall/Soskice (2001a), Estévez-Abe et al. (2001), and Cusack et al. (2006, 2007).
15 While some of the contributors to welfare production regime theory sometimes distinguish 
between firm-specific and industry-specific, or occupational, skills (see in particular Estévez-
Abe et al. 2001), both are counted as specific where it matters. Regardless of the fact that oc-
cupational skills are portable between employers, their market is apparently considered small 
enough for them to be like firm-specific skills for both practical and theoretical purposes. I will 
return to the implications of this.
16 “We start from the … idea that investment in skills that are specific to a particular firm, indus-
try, or occupation exposes their owners to risks for which they will seek nonmarket protection. 
Skills that are portable, by contrast, do not require extensive nonmarket protection, just as the 
exchange of homogeneous goods does not require elaborate nonmarket governance structures” 
(Iversen/Soskice 2001: 875). This seems to imply a causal relationship under which the nature 
of relevant assets determines the nature of the capitalist production regime, in particular of the 
institutions that govern it. Elsewhere, however, the direction of causation seems to be the op-
posite: “The fluid market settings of liberal market economies encourage investment in switch-
able assets, while the dense institutional networks of coordinated market economies enhance 
the attractiveness of investment in specific or co-specific assets” (Hall/Soskice 2001a: 49). I will 
briefly return to the question of historical or causal primacy further down.
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edly, in such countries not only workers but also employers, and the latter with as much 
fervor as the former, lobby the government for protective, market-regulating institu-
tions, so as to make it “rational” for workers to develop “specific” skills by insuring them 
against associated risks, such as employer opportunism or cyclical or structural changes 
in demand. 
Looking at the argument more closely, one finds that it has two parts (see in particular 
Iversen/Soskice 2001). The first is a theory of individual preference formation on social 
policy that cuts across countries, claiming that individuals commanding “general” skills, 
wherever they may live, are less likely to support redistributive social policies than indi-
viduals with “specific” skills.17 The second is that, at the macro level, whole countries are 
distinguished on the basis of whether their citizens’ skills, as generated by their educa-
tional systems, are predominantly specific or general in nature. The aim here is to show 
that where educational systems produce “specific” skills, the interests and preferences 
these give rise to translate into effective political demand for extensive welfare state 
protection. Whether or not a country has predominantly specific skills is believed to be 
indicated by whether it has a broad-based vocational training system (Iversen/Soskice 
2001: 888).18 The present section will consider the concept of general skills, as used in 
asset theory; the preferences that such skills are supposed to generate; and their rela-
tionship to the politics of social protection. The empirical focus will be on the so-called 
“liberal market economies,” or “LMEs,” which is the alias in “asset theory” for the family 
of Anglo-American countries. The next section, then, will look at differences between 
countries, or “varieties of capitalism,” in order to explore whether they can, as claimed 
by the theory, be accounted for by differences in the skill composition of their workforc-
es. Here the emphasis will be on the German-type “coordinated” economies, or “CMEs.”
Whereas Iversen and Soskice (2001) measure political preferences by responses to at-
titude surveys, the critical issue for present purposes is how they define and distinguish 
between general and specific skills. As their operational definitions and the data they use 
have been discussed elsewhere in detail (Kitschelt/Rehm 2006; Tåhlin 2008; Emmeneg-
ger 2009), it suffices here to draw attention to a sequence of foundational conceptual 
decisions. First, unlike human capital theory, Iversen and Soskice base their classifica-
tion of skills as general or specific, and thus as portable or not portable, not simply on 
the structure of demand in the labor market, in particular the degree to which demand 
for a given skill is monopsonistic. Instead they assume that portability of skills depends 
17 This is relevant on the assumption that present social policy is, in fact, explained by present 
mass political preferences as engendered by prevailing present skill patterns – which in turn 
implies that social institutions are highly sensitive, or responsive, to change in political prefer-
ences. None of this is particularly plausible as it neglects the impact of differences in political 
power and fails to take into account the historical stickiness of institutions, not to mention the 
possibility of extant preferences being shaped by extant institutions rather than the other way 
around. I will return to this below.
18 A somewhat more sophisticated indicator is offered by Estévez-Abe et al. (2001). See below, 
however.
16 MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/1
on their content. Whereas for Becker’s economic analysis, which, as noted above, is con-
cerned with the efficient allocation of training costs, rather than with the origin of the 
welfare state, it is enough for skills to be general-in-the-sense-of-portable, so that they 
can be productively used in more than one workplace – regardless of whether they are 
low or high, broad or narrow, theoretical or experiential, explicit or tacit, or whatever – 
for Iversen and Soskice the portability of skills resides not in their market situation but 
in their intrinsic nature as “assets,” that is, their being substantively broad in the sense 
of unspecialized.
Second, Iversen and Soskice define “general” skills, in addition to being economically 
portable and substantively broad, as requiring high, in the sense of academic, education. 
In line with the characteristic conceptual organization of what is interchangeably called 
welfare production regime, VoC, or asset theory into parallel sets of dichotomies, “spe-
cific” skills are defined as nonportable, narrow-in-the-sense-of-specialized, and low in 
the sense of requiring little academic training. 19 The upshot is three allegedly congru-
ent bipolar distinctions folded into one bipolar mega-distinction between two types 
of preference-producing work skills: specific skills of a nonacademic occupational kind 
that are nonportable, specialized and low, and general skills that are portable, broad and 
high, as most typically embodied in academic professional skills. 
In passing, one may note that asset theory’s identification of specific with low skills and 
general with high skills is exactly the opposite of the classical distinction in the Anglo-
American labor market regime between unskilled general workers and specialized craft 
workers, as recalled above. It also differs, in the same way, from the traditional “German” 
distinction between the specialized and high occupational skills of Facharbeiter, and the 
general and low skills of workers without a certified Berufsausbildung. Comparing the 
definitions draws attention to the fact that, by identifying general-in-the-sense-of-porta-
ble skills with broad and high academic skills, and specific-in-the-sense-of-non-portable 
skills with narrow and low occupational skills, “asset theory” loses sight of workers lack-
ing both specific skills and educational credentials – those workers who were referred 
to as “general workers” in the Anglo-American past. This is, incidentally, different in a 
competing class-theoretical schema of work skills which, unlike “asset theory,” empha-
sizes the dependence of the employer on the worker rather than the other way around 
19 See also Kitschelt and Rehm (2006: 81). Iversen and Soskice use an index of skill specificity that 
is a combined measure of occupational specialization and the level of required educational 
attainment, the two being assumed to vary in the same direction. The former component is cal-
culated on information from the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). 
Occupations are scored as specialized to the extent that they belong to a category of occupations 
that comprises a higher share of the total number of occupations than one would expect given 
its share in the national workforce. Tåhlin (2008) notes that, measured this way, skill specificity 
is more or less the inverse of the number of people employed in a given occupation. He also 
explores the way the two elements of the index interact empirically in predicting political atti-
tudes. While his results must be highly discomforting for the theory, I leave them aside here for 
the sake of brevity.
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(Goldthorpe 2000). Here, general in the sense of unspecific skills are skills that are easily 
replaceable by the employer, which is typical of low skills, while specific skills are dif-
ficult to replace, which is characteristic of high skills. Workers owning specific skills are 
correspondingly considered to be in a strong position in the labor market comparable 
to traditional craft workers. The different definitions of general and specific skills in five 
versions of a political economy of work skills are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 General versus specific skills: Alternative meanings
General Specific
Anglo-American labor market regime Unskilled Craft
German vocational  
training regime
Low and uncertified 
Ungelernt
High and occupational 
Facharbeiter
Human capital theory Portable Not portable
Asset theory High and broad: professional Low and narrow: occupational
Class theory Low and easy to replace High and difficult to replace
To move on with our discussion of “asset theory” and the relationship it stipulates be-
tween “general” skills and liberal capitalism, it seems useful to unpack the triple di-
chotomy of portable = broad = high versus nonportable = specialized = low. Allowing 
for economic portability, substantive content, and educational level to vary indepen-
dently, one arrives at a complex, multidimensional tableau of skill types (Table 2). Ini-
tial inspection reveals that asset theory’s “general” skills that are substantively broad, 
economically portable and high-in-the-sense-of-academic – like the skills of the math-
ematicians working for the U.S. financial and information technology sectors, which 
are the only example offered by Estévez-Abe at al. (2001: 149) – and the “specific,” non-
portable, and low-occupational skills of, presumably, workers in Anglo-American au-
tomobile assembly are only two of eight possible combinations.20 One notes, for example, 
that there are broad skills that have severe small-numbers problems with respect to 
their portability, like those of astrophysicists in the world of high academic skills, and 
of Japanese automobile workers among non-academic skills. Conversely, there are nar-
row skills that are widely portable, like in brain surgery or, at the nonacademic level, in 
sports such as European football.21 Moreover, specific skills that are neither broad nor 
portable in a market or a human-capital sense need not at all be low and occupational; 
they can also be high and academic, like specialized expertise in early Byzantine military 
history. Furthermore, and importantly, it is not just academically trained professionals 
who have skills that are both substantively broad and economically portable; the same 
holds also for the unskilled Jedermann workers whom “asset theory,” as pointed out, has 
conceptually eliminated – one must assume to enable itself to support the revisionist 
welfare state theory it was conceived to support. 
20 See also Busemeyer (2009a: 397), who observes that “the variety of skill regimes is more com-
plex than the dichotomous distinction between LMEs and CMEs implies.”
21 Here, portability is ensured by standardization of job descriptions across employers, for ex-
ample for central defenders, due to a uniform “production technology” taking the place of trade 
union job control.
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Table 2 General versus specific: Substantive versus economic
Economic definition
General = portable Specific = not portable
Substantive definition
General = broad
Mathematics 
Office cleaning
Astrophysics 
Car assembly (Japan)
Specific = narrow 
Brain surgery 
Central defense
Byzantine history 
Car assembly (U.S.)
High (academic, professional)
Low (non-academic, occupational)
Having broken up the radically simplified dualistic property space of asset theory’s ac-
count of the relationship between skills and labor markets, one notes several more cri-
tical points:
1. Inspection of Table 2 reveals that economic portability of skills is far from being 
primarily or exclusively a function of their substantive breadth. A factor that would 
seem to be much more influential is market conditions. One may note that the 
sectors employing the highly trained mathematical generalists of Estévez-Abe et al. 
(2001) were ones that happened to be rapidly expanding at the time when the the-
ory was being developed. Still, while such sectors are undoubtedly using the most 
abstract and, in this sense, most general kind of knowledge (if only in parts of their 
operations), they represent no more than a small share even of the U.S. economy. 
In sectors where labor demand is small and static, like in astrophysics, the fact that 
astrophysicists have substantively very broad skills does not help them find employ-
ment. At the same time, much more narrowly specialized skills, such as those of 
brain surgeons, may be in high demand by a multiplicity of employers, making these 
skills eminently portable. 
2. Portability of skills is also determined by labor market regimes, which may entirely 
neutralize the portability effect of substantive breadth. A case in point here is, again, 
Japanese auto workers, whose skills are famously much broader than those of their 
American counterparts. Nevertheless they are effectively nonportable due to effecti-
ve collusion among employers against worker mobility. 
3. The relationship between skills and social policy preferences is complex far beyond 
“asset theory’s” expectation of “general” skills producing convergent employer and 
worker preferences for unprotected free market capitalism. It is probably true that 
none of the various kinds of high-in-the-sense-of-academic skills (Table 2) are like-
ly to give rise to political demands for a redistributive welfare state. But this does 
not mean that owners of academic skills are not interested in social protection; like 
nineteenth-century craft unions, they only object to redistribution. Given that the 
level of educational achievement may be more a measure of class than of skill,22 as 
22 Similar Kitschelt in Phelan et al. (2006: 415), who finds that “asset specificity washes out as a 
predictor of citizens’ preferences on health care and pension plans, once we hold constant for 
blue-collar status.”
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Tåhlin suggests (2008), the latter should not be surprising. Concerning the former, 
there is no indication that the middle classes like to lose employment or income as 
a result of cyclical fluctuations in labor demand or of structural and technological 
change. Nor are they necessarily willing to be unlimitedly mobile in national labor 
markets, not to mention international ones. In fact, while individuals with high for-
mal education may not favor redistributive state intervention, they usually do insist 
on being insured against income loss by a government policy of economic growth 
or a central bank policy of easy money, both of which may be considered functional 
equivalents, and sometimes quite costly ones, of social policy proper.23
4. Exploring further how the nature of skills affects political demand, one may ask 
in the language of welfare production theory how there can be investment in very 
high academic skills – like brain surgery and Byzantine history – that are obviously 
much more specialized than the theory’s demonstration case, mathematics, in the 
absence of a welfare state protecting investors against the hazards of asset-specificity. 
To understand why brain surgeons and Byzantinists, just as mathematicians and as-
trophysicists, are not typically staunch supporters of redistributive social policies, it 
helps to consider the possibility that what asset theory calls general skills are actually 
the specialized skills of the modern successors of the elite nineteenth-century craft 
workers.24 In fact, most of today’s academic professions share with yesterday’s craft 
unions not just a deep dislike of redistributive state intervention but also a staunchly 
defended capacity to exercise a wide variety of forms of job control. Far from con-
fidently abandoning themselves to the vagaries of the market, doctors, lawyers, pro-
fessors, and the like – all owners of high and therefore “general” skills, in the reduced 
property space of “asset theory” – effectively control market entry, training, working 
conditions, and even fee schedules (Abbott 1988). While employment and indeed 
status protection for today’s educated middle classes – just as for the middle classes 
of the nineteenth century, the skilled craftsmen – are achieved outside of the welfare 
state in the labor market, they are no less effective both in encouraging investment in 
economically vulnerable specialized skills and in protecting the market position and 
income claims of owners of prestigious human capital, regardless of the number of 
their potential employers.25
23 As has recently been learned, the same may be said of publicly subsidized mortgages and “lib-
eral” regulations of consumer credit – showing that a protective state, far from being dispens-
able even in a “liberal market” world of “general” skills, may take many different forms. 
24 And what were then called general skills, their owners being permanently at risk of becoming 
and remaining unemployed, may be what asset theory refers to as specific skills in terms of their 
market chances.
25 It appears strange that those in “asset theory” who connect academic skills to anti-welfare state 
political preferences could overlook a market-regulating institution such as academic tenure 
by which they deal with their own small-numbers problems. By controlling tenure, academics 
limit access to their professions and secure guaranteed lifetime employment for themselves and 
the few others that manage to pass a long series of exacting examinations at the hands of their 
potential peers.
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5. Turning now to low in the sense of non-academic skills and the political interests 
they presumably produce, the important point is that “asset theory” has eliminated 
from the definition of general skills the skills of those who used to be called “general 
workers” in the Anglo-American tradition, or “unskilled” in distinction from the, 
highly specialized, “skilled” or “craft” workers.26 Note that it is only as a result of 
this that “asset theory” can empirically find that owners of “general” skills object to 
government intervention in free markets while supporting government spending 
on opera houses and the environment (Iversen/Soskice 2001: 887). The eliminati-
on of the unskilled from the ranks of the generally skilled must seem all the more 
astonishing as janitors and food preparers are at least as widely employable across 
economic sectors as academically trained mathematicians, especially in Anglo-Ame-
rican economies.27 If general workers as defined would include low-skilled service 
workers, such as office cleaners, as would have to be the case if the defining criterion 
was in fact portability of skills, it would be hard to believe that workers with general 
skills should rationally prefer subsidies to high culture over unemployment benefit, 
social assistance, and active labor market policy. 
Summing up, then, if a country like the United States has no social policy, this can 
be explained by the rational preferences of a workforce with, allegedly, predominantly 
“general” skills only by a theory that has conceptually blinded itself against the obvi-
ous fact that most unspecialized skills are far from high skills. Asset theory ignoring 
the vast number of workers in Anglo-American countries whose skills are general only 
in the sense of being Jedermannsqualifikationen, other factors must be responsible for 
the lack of social protection in Anglo-American labor markets than a collective choice 
of optimally efficient transaction rules.28 As a matter of fact, nowhere does historical-
institutionalist reasoning trump theories of rational choice more clearly than here. To-
day’s liberal labor markets bear the traces of the defeat of the “general workers” of the 
nineteenth century at the hands of both their skilled fellow workers and their employers. 
At present, as in the past, the highly skilled are far from averse to employment protec-
tion: they only see no need to share it as long as they have the power to get it exclusively 
and on their own. That the broad mass of unskilled and low-skilled workers in Anglo-
American countries have no social protection is not because it is not rational for them 
to want it but because their historical quest for class solidarity has failed. The weakness 
of the Anglo-American welfare state is not due to the predominance of “general” skills 
among today’s Anglo-American workforces and the liberal preferences to which such 
26 As Emmenegger (2009: 412) has it: “The distinction between specific and general skills clouds 
the difference between skilled and unskilled workers.” He also finds that asset theory “cannot be 
extended to employees with hardly any skills” (2009: 425).
27 Hamburger cooks can be found not just in the food and restaurant industries but also in all 
firms and institutions that operate cafeterias, including universities.
28 Using Goldthorpe’s classification, Emmenegger (2009: 422, passim) shows that workers with 
general skills, in the sense of low skills, have strong preferences for social protection. See also 
Kitschelt and Rehm (2006: 76), who find that skill specificity makes no difference for welfare 
state preferences. 
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skills allegedly give rise. Instead, it is due to early entrenchment of the particularistic 
interests of elite workers with strong market power who simply had no use for a univer-
salistic system of state-run social protection. 
With time, of course, the institutional protections that skilled workers had won for 
themselves were dismantled by a successful strategy of de-skilling in the struggle of 
employers against craft union job control. Union-breaking had the support of the edu-
cated middle classes, who at the same time managed to defend their own craft-like con-
trol over their labor markets. One result of the defeat of trade unionism was a historical 
attrition of occupational skills among Anglo-American workers; another, a welcome 
byproduct of the separation of conception and execution at the point of production, 
was increasing polarization between a growing middle class of foremen and “general” 
managers and the indistinct masses of workers left behind with “specific” in the sense of 
low skills. The former, incidentally, are legally barred in the United States from union-
ization. In the reality of the American social structure, it is not the tiny number of 
Harvard-trained mathematicians of Wall Street, or of Stanford-trained mathematicians 
of Silicon Valley, that are representative of Iversen and Soskice’s academically educated 
generalists (as distinguished from the low-skilled generalists such as office cleaners), 
but rather Erik Olin Wright’s middling classes of experts, managers and supervisors, 
with skills that are portable, broad and high-in-the-sense-of-academic (Wright 1985). 
Their presence in the workplace, where they are much more numerous in the United 
States and Britain than in countries with a vocational training system, makes for con-
tinued de-skilling of first-line production, if only because this is needed to justify the 
growing inequality in pay between workers and their “generally skilled” superiors.29
Much more than present preferences, it is past power struggles in the formative mo-
ments at critical junctures in a country’s history that account for the institutions gov-
erning modern labor markets, including the formation and allocation of work skills.30 
Rather than being instantly created and momentarily disposable, institutions are of 
long making and breaking, with what they have been in the past having conditioned 
what they are now and conditioning what they can be in the future. Liberal labor mar-
kets, like all institutions, operate in the shadow of their history: of craft union self-help 
through “free collective bargaining;” of “general unions” prevented by the legacy of craft 
unionism from turning into encompassing industrial unions; of the breaking of craft 
unions by the de-skilling of work; and not least of the survival of job control among the 
educated middle classes. Present opportunity structures of both workers and employers, 
including present economic “assets” and the strategic preferences they encourage, are 
the result not of economically rational decisions today, but of political struggles and 
29 Note in this context the so-called “college wage premium” which has been growing for decades 
now, putting a meritocratic facade on the American economy at a time of incessantly rising 
inequality.
30 Similarly Trampusch (2010) in a comparative analysis covering Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland.
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historical events in the time of early industrialization. This is also true for the welfare 
state and the extent to which it is available for social protection from fluctuating mar-
kets and structural change for different categories of workers.
Occupational skills: Low and narrow?
As noted, “asset theory” takes the presence of a strong vocational training system in a 
country as evidence that the country’s predominant skills are specific rather than gen-
eral. But are the skills typically generated by German-style vocational training really 
more specific in the sense of narrower, lower, and less portable than Anglo-American 
skills, making labor market transactions dependent on a kind and extent of social pro-
tection that is economically dispensable in so-called “LMEs,” due to their on average 
higher, broader, and more portable skills? 
1. As yet, it has never been attempted to measure comparatively the occupational com-
petences of workers in different countries, in analogy perhaps to the PISA surveys 
conducted by the OECD.31 There is, however, considerable circumstantial evidence, 
economic as well as institutional, to suggest that German-type occupational skills 
have historically been much less subject to de-skilling than Anglo-American skills. 
In fact, they have been broadened and upgraded in a protracted process of moderni-
zation of the nationally administered regime of registered occupations that reaches 
back at least to the 1960s. There are reasons to believe that it was to a large extent this 
process that sustained the typically flat hierarchies and decentralized work organi-
zation found by comparative industrial sociology in German workplaces (Maurice 
et al. 1980), as well as the traditionally low wage differentials in Germany between 
workers and management and the resulting, characteristically compressed wage 
structure (Streeck 1997b; Marsden 2000: 200−202).
 As to the breadth of German-style occupational skills in particular, the three parties 
that are jointly running the German vocational training system – the government, 
organized employers, and the trade unions – have, as mentioned, continuously re-
duced the number of certified occupations and, in the process, broadened the skill 
base of those that remained (Busemeyer 2009b). More importantly, in a number of 
industries, training curricula for the first one or two years of the standard three-year 
apprenticeship in adjacent occupations were consolidated, moving specialization 
forward to the second or third year. The intention was to create a broad layer of 
shared basic skills for neighboring occupations,32 so as to facilitate both inter-occup-
31 For an introduction to the results from a German perspective, see <www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/
pisa/PISA-2000_Overview.pdf.>.
32 Encompassing, in terms of Iversen and Soskice (2001), as many occupations as possible in a 
given “major group” of the ISCO. 
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ational mobility of workers and non-hierarchical coordination among workers with 
related skills. 
2. Concerning the level of skills produced by occupational training, raised occupati-
onal requirements were accompanied by increasingly strict supervision of training 
practice at the workplace. Today, more intensively than ever before, local chambers 
of industry and Handwerk, with union participation, conduct on-site checks for the 
quality of training and for firms’ compliance with the more demanding curricula. 
This, together with the resulting increase in the costs of training, is considered ano-
ther explanation for why many smaller firms have ceased to offer training places. 
In any case, the fact that Anglo-American training looks more “academic,” with more 
young people attending college or university,33 need not mean that the qualifications 
it generates exceed those generated by vocational training. Complaints abound on 
vast differences in quality between universities, polytechnics, and community col-
leges in Anglo-American countries; on narrowly specialized and deeply fragment-
ed curricula; on “customized” firm-specific training with very little portability; on 
training modules that are broken down to the smallest teachable unit; on courses 
that bear no relation to the reality of work in real workplaces; and on the absence 
of coordination between workplace needs and school curricula, among other things. 
Without comparative data on the level and distribution of work skills, claims that 
Anglo-American workforces have more “general” in-the-sense-of-higher skills on ac-
count of a larger number of college students may not be more than an expression of 
ethnocentric prejudice.34 
3. Finally, the portability of specific-in-the-sense-of-occupational skills was always hig-
her than suggested by “asset theory,”35 even before the systematic broadening and 
upgrading of skill profiles. Unlike in the United States and Britain, in German-type 
33 Which is in fact far from unambiguously clear. Consider the bizarre scoring decisions by Es-
tévez-Abe et al. (2001: 170) on the nature of national skill profiles. For example, U.K. skills 
are counted as “occupational/general” on the basis of 13 percent of 24–35-year-olds having a 
university degree and 76 percent an “upper secondary education.” Germany, however, is scored 
“firm/industry/occupational” with also 13 percent university graduates and 81 percent (!) in up-
per secondary education. The Netherlands, with 22 percent in the university category, i.e., only 
four points behind the leader, the United States, and nine points before the United Kingdom, 
are classified as “industry-occupational.” The label “general” is reserved exclusively for Anglo 
countries (U.S., Canada, Australia, U.K., New Zealand, and Ireland)!
34 See the repeated reminders sent by the OECD to the German government that Germany does 
not have enough university graduates (the latest example is Organisation for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation 2009). That Germany’s international competitiveness vastly exceeds that of 
the U.S. or the U.K., with a wage and income structure that is – still – much more egalitarian 
than in the two leading Anglo-American countries, is never mentioned in this context, although 
one might imagine that it could have something to do with it. 
35 Which, as noted, folds firm-specific and occupational skills into the same category of “specific” 
skills.
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systems the completion of an apprenticeship is certified not by a union, but by a 
tripartite public examination board. This makes certificates highly credible. Moreo-
ver, a skilled worker certificate indicates that, in addition to his or her specific skills, 
a worker has acquired the tacit skills that come with actual work experience. Em-
ployers, unlike asset theorists, know that a good part of these skills are exceedingly 
portable. A certificate also signals to employers that a worker has the extrafunctional 
skills needed for applying himself to a difficult task over an extended time, as for 
example finishing an apprenticeship. That the tacit and extrafunctional skills that 
come with workplace-based training are portable beyond specific occupations or 
groups of occupations is shown by the fact that chemical factories like to employ 
apprenticed bakers as first-line operators, relying on their functional skills in mixing 
and transforming substances, as well as on their acquired extrafunctional habit of 
diligence and patience in controlling a long-drawn-out production process.
In addition to ethnocentric bias, other explanations for the belief that occupational 
skills are narrower, lower, and less portable than they actually are include ignorance of 
the differences between occupational and craft work regimes. As pointed out, whereas 
craft unions have long defended narrow specialization while redefining skill into an en-
titlement to employment in a union-imposed standardized pattern of division of labor, 
occupational systems have broadened and updated skill profiles to increase workplace 
and labor market flexibility and keep pace with technological progress. In Germany, 
pre-industrial job territories were preserved, if at all, not in the factories of the modern 
economy, but in the small-firm artisanal sector where craftsmen survived as indepen-
dent small business owners, much more than in Anglo-American countries (Streeck 
1989). In sharp contrast to the importation of the craft regime into the factories of early 
industrializing Anglo-American societies, work in German industry, as lucidly pointed 
out by David Marsden (1999, 2000), came to be organized at an early point around 
occupational functions and procedures defined by tasks, qualifications, or capacities, 
instead of job territories or “tools of the trade.” Not only did this make the typically 
German workplace less rigid and in need of “managerial” supervision. It also gave rise 
to a sustained shared interest of workers and employers in a continuous development 
of work skills.
A further factor that must not be overlooked is the low social prestige, especially in the 
United States, not just of manual work as such but also of anything called “vocational.” 
In the United States, attending college was and still is widely regarded as an obligatory 
entry path into the “middle class,” making it essential for anyone sharing the, equally 
obligatory, “American dream” of upward mobility. In fact college prepares its students 
above all for the large number of general, or generalist, managerial positions charac-
teristic of the American economy – positions that exist as a result of the successful de-
skilling of craft workers. As today’s first-line operators have to pay with their low wages 
for the large and often well-paid managerial overhead exercising over them the control 
that has been wrested from them in the class conflicts of the past, the specific division 
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of labor in American workplaces and the skill pattern complementing it is, as noted, 
explained not by functional expediency but by political power.
Those who fail to get into college – where college includes all sort of tertiary institutions 
providing classroom instruction – thereby reveal themselves to be “practically talented,” 
meaning unfit for the managerial middle class appointed to control them. If at all, they 
attend – or better, have to attend – “vocational school.” Actually, in large parts of the 
United States, vocational education was long seen as a reserve for Afro-Americans, a 
stigma that is still alive far beyond the South. It seems that the particular classist and rac-
ist connotations of “vocational” as opposed to “academic” – connotations that are much 
stronger in the United States than in Europe, although Europe is catching up – also color 
Anglo-American perceptions of European vocational training systems, including of the 
breadth and level of the skills they produce. In fact they even seem to inform scholarly 
concepts such as, in particular, the distinction between “specific” and “general” skills.
An indication of the traditionally low esteem of manual work in Anglo-American soci-
eties is the distinction in the English language between professions and occupations. As 
pointed out, underlying it is the sharp division in Anglo-American culture between the 
“academic” and therefore general and high skills of the middle class – whose restrictive 
labor market practices are not recognized as such – and the non-academic and on this 
account supposedly low and specific skills of manual workers associated with, socially 
illegitimate, claims to job ownership. There is no parallel to this in German, where the 
word Beruf is used equally for both professions and occupations. Thus a skilled metal 
mechanic in Germany has a Beruf just as a physician or a professor. This is why Ger-
mans sometimes irritate Anglo-American audiences when, in English, they speak of the 
“profession” of, say, a carpenter. In this context it is interesting to remember that in the 
1980s, an English industrial sociologist, who had studied the small-firm Handwerk sec-
tor in Germany, expressed his admiration for the high levels of competence he had seen 
by referring to German Handwerksberufe as “professions for the people.”36
If German-style occupational skills are in fact broad, high, and portable, and more so 
on average than Anglo-American skills, the question remains why employment protec-
tion and an extensive welfare state should exist in occupational countries. As in the case 
of the presumably “general” skills of Anglo-American workers presumably accounting 
for the liberal nature of “liberal market economies,” economistic-functionalist explana-
tions fail spectacularly. Of course, outside of the conceptual framework of “asset theory,” 
it is not hard to see why workers who have employment alternatives should neverthe-
less wish to have their present employment protected, for example because they want 
to continue to live where they live rather than having to move where alternative jobs 
are. More generally, workers may find it attractive to be able to quit while being pro-
tected from being fired, although their employers may on account of their high skills 
36 Unfortunately I cannot locate the source any more. Apparently the concept is taken from Gerstl 
and Jacobs (1976). 
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not normally be inclined to fire them, even in the absence of legal employment protec-
tion. In fact, for a long time this was exactly the situation of the German Facharbeiter, 
a situation that was in many ways the foundation of their exceptionally strong posi-
tion inside their employment relationship.37 Solid employment protection and high 
unemployment benefits may actually be seen as an institutional reinforcement of the 
economic indispensability, and thus the power, that workers, according to Goldthorpe 
(2000), derive from high and specific skills. 
But why would employers agree to an employment and skill regime that puts them at 
an obvious disadvantage? Once more, there is no way of explaining this in efficiency 
or transaction-cost theoretical terms. Only a political explanation will do, exactly as in 
the case of labor markets in Anglo-America and, for that matter, Japan. Extensive social 
protection of the sort found in European welfare states cannot possibly be the result 
of a rational choice of efficiency-seeking firms based on the nature of skills defined as 
“assets.” Rather than the product of cooperative economizing on transaction costs, they 
reflect the distribution of power between capital and labor at crucial moments in his-
tory, when formative decisions were made on a country’s future social and institutional 
structure. In Germany, as in other countries with encompassing political unionism and 
strong representation of workers in the political party system, it was possible histori-
cally to impose on employers an employment regime that improved the situation of all 
workers, including those for whom an already strong market position was no reason to 
object to it being strengthened even further by political-institutional means. That this 
was no more than a second-best solution for capital is indicated, among other things, by 
its active contribution to the worldwide liberalization of the postwar political economy 
during the last two decades.38
37 Obviously this was the opposite of the Japanese condition where the worker was unable to quit, 
due to the resulting loss of his deferred wages and to other employers refusing to hire him. At 
the same time, a Japanese employer had and has the power to dismiss workers whom he consid-
ers to have violated their duties.
38 A question that suggests itself at this point is how a high-protection labor market regime that 
was clearly not “required” for profitability, and therefore never stood a chance of becoming the 
first “rational” choice of employers, could in the end have turned out so economically efficient 
and even superior to countries where employers had historically been strong enough to impose 
their will. Ultimately this raises the issue of causality in the relationship between skill patterns 
and political institutions. As noted, “asset theory” is ambiguous here, allowing interchangeably 
for skills conditioning institutions and institutions (including not only labor market regimes but 
also systems of political representation, Cusack et al. 2007) shaping (investment in) skills (on as-
set theory’s ambiguity, see also Korpi 2006: 181). Elsewhere (Streeck 2004) I have explained the 
– temporary – economic superiority of what was only the second-best solution from the perspec-
tive of employers as the outcome of a sequence of political conflicts and economic adjustments to 
its results, with capital learning with time to make the best out of what it had been unable to pre-
vent. Where such a sequence occurs and is allowed to occur, what had originally been constraints 
on firms may become “beneficial” for them (Streeck 1997a), as they force firms to adopt more 
demanding and perhaps, as a result, more competitive modes of production (for a similar point, 
based on comparative data, see Harcourt/Wood 2007). Whether or not such a process of indus-
trial upgrading toward more socially acceptable modes of profit-making does and can take place 
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In conclusion
Asset theoretical accounts of the political economy of modern capitalism explain social 
protection with reference to the nature of the work skills employed by a country’s firms 
in their pursuit of nationally characteristic production strategies. As pointed out, pat-
terns of skill, production, and protection are conceptually organized by “asset theory” 
into congruent bipolar distinctions lined up with the VoC master distinction between 
“LMEs” and “CMEs.” Skills conceived as assets are divided into the categories of gener-
al = high-in-the-sense-of-academic = broad = portable and specific = low-in-the-sense-
of-nonacademic = narrow = nonportable-occupational; production is either mass or 
post-industrial production using general skills, or diversified production using specific 
skills; and social protection from markets is either absent (in “LMEs” using general skills 
for mass or service production) or present (in “CMEs” using specific skills for diversified 
and industrial production). Congruence between or clustering of dichotomized skill 
types, production modes, and forms of social protection is accounted for in economis-
tic-functionalist terms. In countries where social protection is absent, this is supposedly 
because the skills required for the national mode of production do not require protec-
tion for efficiency, thus making protection undesirable for both employers and workers. 
Where protection is to the contrary present, this is because without it the type of skills 
that firms need and workers must acquire could be neither created nor transacted.
“It can scarcely be denied,” writes someone who must know, “that the supreme goal of all 
theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without 
having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience” (Einstein 
1934: 165). In a simplified version, this principle is referred to as “Einstein’s razor,” quoted 
colloquially as “make things as simple as possible, but not simpler.”39 According to Wikipe-
dia, the principle is invoked “when an appeal to Occam’s razor results in an over-simplified 
explanation that leads to a false conclusion.” Among the many “data of experience” that 
asset theory suppresses for the sake of simplicity, if not of economistic ideology or confor-
mity with the Zeitgeist of “rational choice,” are that general skills need not always be high, 
and high skills not always broad or portable; that specific skills are not necessarily low, and 
low skills not always immobile; and that occupational skills in some countries may be as 
high and broad as academic skills in others, and far from firm or even industry-specific.
Asset theory’s revision of class and conflict theoretical accounts of the politics of social 
protection presupposes that the reality of skills can meaningfully be folded into the 
depends on many contingent conditions, some of which I have discussed in earlier work. In any 
case, even where “asset theory” emphasizes the causal significance of institutions for skills, rather 
than the other way around, it does so in an efficiency-theoretical manner, modeling the process 
in terms of a consensual search for the most economically advantageous way of making use of a 
given institutional endowment (an exception is probably Iversen/Stephens 2008). By contrast, I 
would emphasize the conflictual nature of the search of a political economy for its specific mode 
of production, driven by power struggles between the classes, as in imposed wage compression 
through industrial trade unions or in Bravermanian de-skilling (similar Korpi 2006).
39 Or, even shorter: “Make it simple but not too simple.”
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radically simplified bipolar property space of a one-dimensional distinction between 
general and specific. As that space proves insufficiently complex, the theory’s core proj-
ect – substituting transaction cost economics for politics – must collapse,40 and political 
cleavages, market conditions, and the distribution of power between the classes in cru-
cial moments of a country’s history come again to the fore as principal explanatory fac-
tors. Thus, the reason why the many workers in Anglo-American countries with skills 
that are “general” but also low have little social protection, if any at all, is not that the 
nature of their skills has made protection dispensable for them, but that they never had 
the allies and the power needed to get it. Similarly, the fact that workers with occupa-
tional skills outside Anglo-America enjoy, or in the past enjoyed, the benefits of exten-
sive social protection is not explained by their being immobile in the labor market – in 
fact, as we have seen, they may be very mobile indeed. Nor is it explained by their em-
ployers’ concerns about their willingness to be trained in the kind of skills that the firms 
in their country need. Instead it is due to workers’ historical capacity, derived from en-
compassing organization in political trade unions, to extract from capital concessions 
in excess of what capital would have considered functionally necessary for profitability.
Actually, as we have seen, a country’s predominant skill pattern may itself be explained 
historically by nationally specific institutional constraints and opportunities for capital 
and labor, in particular with respect to the politics of work organization and of author-
ity at the point of production, although decidedly not as an outcome of cooperative 
economizing on transaction costs. As far as Anglo-American countries are concerned, 
relevant factors were the successful particularism in the nineteenth century of elite 
workers with high but narrow skills; futile struggles of other workers with low or no 
skills for universal forms of social protection, against both employers and craft unions; 
and a successful effort at de-skilling by employers fighting the restrictive practices of 
skilled labor, which generated high wage dispersion and an oversized middleclass of 
managerial “generalists.” Outside Anglo-America, by comparison, early elimination 
of elite particularism among workers, the rise of encompassing political trade unions, 
compressed wage scales through industry-level collective bargaining, and successful 
political mobilization for universal social rights gave rise, in some countries at least, to 
a tripartite public policy of general upskilling, allowing for low hierarchies, high flex-
ibility and considerable worker autonomy at the point of production, and in turn en-
abling as well as constraining employers to specialize on diversified products with high 
value-added (Streeck 2004). Eliminating class and class conflict from political economy, 
and replacing the constraints of history and power with the timeless functionalist vol-
untarism of rational choice, is an ideological project that can clearly not be grounded in 
the complex reality of the formation and deployment of work skills.
40 This holds even where, as in Iversen and Stephens (2008), politics is invited back by allowing 
for a reversal of the originally stipulated causal direction, with social institutions shaping skills 
and the production strategies of firms, rather than the other way around. In either case, the 
consolidated triple dichotomy of content, level, and portability involved in the distinction be-
tween general and specific skills is bound to produce an oversimplified, and therefore inevitably 
distorted, picture. 
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